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"The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom"
-Justice William 0. Douglas'
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I. INTRODUCTION
Record-keeping, disclosure, and privacy-related statutes along with
their accompanying case law, are creating a surge in employment pri-
vacy law. This law establishes new or revised privacy requirements
that force employers to constantly review personnel forms, policies,
and practices. Some of these privacy requirements may be conflict-
ing, mandating that employers maintain employee confidentiality and
yet also disclose employment information.
Many employers collect, maintain, and use vast quantities of data
about their employees which the unions, the government, and others
frequently attempt to access. Unaccustomed to outside scrutiny,
many employers are surprised to learn that they must disclose cer-
tain information to these groups as well as to their own employees.
Employment privacy law has no clearly defined boundary. It en-
compasses a myriad of employment statutes and case law, and finds
support in constitutional law. As a field, it developed as part of spe-
cialized employment law areas involving record-keeping and disclo-
sure, labor relations, health and safety, labor standards, and fair
employment practices.
Just as the erosion of at-will employment dominated the 1980's,
privacy will be the main theme for employment law in the 1990's. To
understand this developing area this article outlines the increasing
importance of privacy in employment law by examining, in particu-




Employment law is a maze of common law doctrines, statutes, con-
tractual rules, judicial pronouncements, and administrative agency
findings. As a consequence, few clearly discernible legal patterns are
recognizable and the law is neither uniform nor predictable. In fact,
even within a narrow employment issue, the law can vary considera-
bly depending upon whether an administrative agency or a court is
involved.2 Statutes and court decisions reflect the conflict between
2. Pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)
(NLRA), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) occasionally does not follow the
court decisions in determining the correct employment law principle to be applied.
This nonacquiescence of the NLRB with court decisions has occurred over:
(a) whether the NLRB should initially defer its review procedures in unfair labor
practice cases for resolution under the collective bargaining agreement's grievance ar-
bitration procedure; and (b) who constitutes a "successor" employer. See C. MORRIS,
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 694-756, 914-91 (2d ed. 1983); Maranville, Nonacquies-
cence Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 471 (1986); see also Bakaly & Bryan, Survival of the Bargaining Agreement: The
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the employee and the employer,3 and make employment law4 such a
hot political issue.5
Employment law provides a mechanism for dealing with conflicts
involving not only wages, hours, and employment conditions, but also
Effect of Burns, 27 VAND. L. REV. 117 (1974); Nash, Wilder & Banov, The Development
of the Collyer Deferral Doctrine, 27 VAND. L. REV. 23 (1974).
Most courts have not taken kindly to the disrespect for authority reflected in an
agency's refusal to follow court decisions. See NLRB v. Blackstone Co., 685 F.2d 102,
106 n.5 (3d Cir. 1982) ("We consider the Board's contrary instructions to its administra-
tive law judges to be completely improper and reflective of a bureaucratic arrogance
which will not be tolerated."). Nonacquiescence by administrative agencies has also oc-
curred under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1982) (OSHA), and the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397(f) (1982) (SSA). See,
e.g., Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (SSA); Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. v. Marshall, 636 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1980) (OSHA).
3. For discussion of the labor movement within the United States, see C. MORRIS,
supra note 2, at 1-67. The NLRA's adoption in 1935 illustrates the shifting conflict be-
tween employee and employer. Prior to the NLRA's adoption, three major themes il-
lustrated this employee, union, and employer conflict:
1. The case law afforded a cumulative demonstration that the courts were
not institutionally capable of formulating or implementing a [uniform, co-
hesive, and] workable labor policy.
2. The course of legislative and judicial action revealed increasing awareness
that the role of organized labor presented a question of national propor-
tions that no state was capable of answering definitively [on an individual
basis].
3. There was the development of two mutually incompatible national policies
toward organized labor: one regarding it as creating market restraints in-
imical to the national economy, and the other regarding it as necessary to
a regime of industrial peace based upon a balanced bargaining relationship
between employers wielding the combined power of incorporated capital
wealth and unions wielding the power of organized labor.
Id. at 3.
4. The conflict that resulted in the NLRA's adoption is similar to what is cur-
rently occurring in the at-will employment area where either the employee or em-
ployer can terminate the employment relationship at any time and for no reason. See
generally H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE chs. 1, 9 (2d ed.
1987).
Courts are indicating that they are not institutionally capable of formulating or im-
plementing a workable policy to address the needs of employees and employers in-
volved in the at-will employment relationship. See, e.g., Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa.
Super. 85, 99 n.3, 515 A.2d 571, 579 n.3 (1986); Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 354
Pa. Super. 199, 221, 511 A.2d 830, 841 (1986); Darlington v. General Elec., 350 Pa. Super.
183, 191, 504 A.2d 306, 309 (1986); see also Decker, At-Will Employment in Penn-
sylvania After Banas and Darlington: New Concerns for a Legislative Solution, 32
VILL. L. REV. 101 (1986) [hereinafter Decker, New Concerns]; Decker, At-Will Employ-
ment: Abolition and Federal Statutory Regulation, 61 U. DET. J. URB. L. 351 (1984)
[hereinafter Decker, At-Will Employment]; Decker, At-Will Employment: A Proposal
for its Abolition and Statutory Regulation, 1 HOFSTRA LAB. L.F. 187 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Decker, Statutory Regulation].
5. See Huge & McCarthy, Collective Bargaining in the 1980's-Comments and
Observations, 1 HOFsTRA LAB. L.F. 23 (1983).
power contests within and between various groups and personalities.
Such contests may include confrontations between employees, union
officials, and employers. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
protects employee rights by providing for full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives for negotiating
the terms and conditions of employment or other mutual aid or pro-
tection. Thus, the Act statutorily restrains and defuses potential con-
flict between employee, union, and employer by transforming
physical violence and economic coercion into collective bargaining.7
B. The Employment Relationship
Employee and employer relationships are the basis of our economic
structure and affect most people over the greater part of their lives.
Increasingly, people depend on others for the opportunity to produce
their daily income, and the loss of this employment can be a consid-
erable hardship with disastrous consequences. The employer-em-
ployee relationship has become fundamental to society.8 Besides
marriage, no other relationship preoccupies daily affairs so
completely.
The employment relationship has become very complex because of
multi-faceted human resource functions, wage and benefit programs,
and government regulation. One of the consequences has been the
generation of large quantities of documented information and
records. Once the employee enters the employment relationship, he
has little or no choice over whether to provide sensitive and often de-
tailed information. This information may reveal the employee's in-
nermost beliefs, ethical attitudes, and outside interests and activities.9
Such information may fall into the hands of co-workers not privi-
leged to receive it. As a result, the information may cause co-work-
ers to form incorrect and unfavorable opinions of the employee
which may affect his standing and reputation inside and outside the
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
7. See Sanders, Some Comments on Labor Dispute Settlement Processes, 27 VAND.
L. REV. 5, 12-13 (1974).
8. We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others
for our means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely
dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except
for the relief supplied by the various forms of social security. Such depen-
dence of the mass of the people upon others for all of their income is some-
thing new in the world. For our generation, the substance of life is in another
man's hands.
F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951) (emphasis in original); see also
Comment, Employee Privacy Rights: A Proposal, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 155 (1978).
9. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (striking down a statute which
required teachers, as a condition of employment, to list every organization to which
they belonged, as a violation of their freedom of association).
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workplace.O Further, the employee may experience restricted op-
portunities to develop and maintain political, economic, and social
relationships.
Historically, an employee's ability to challenge an employer's un-
fair, intrusive, or damaging practices has been limited." The employ-
ment relationship generally "denies any right to the employee who is
arbitrarily treated [by his employer and: is] ... without a union or a
contract."12 Absent a statutory or contractual restriction, an em-
ployee or employer can usually terminate the employment relation-
ship at any time for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. This
type of relationship is said to be at-will.13
Congress and various state legislatures have prohibited the sum-
mary termination of an at-will employee in certain instances.14
Courts have determined that an employer may terminate an em-
ployee for any reason unless expressly not allowed by statute.15 The
primary federal statutes limiting an employer's right to terminate an
at-will employee are the NLRA16 and certain sections of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 17 The NLRA provides that an em-
ployer may not terminate an employee where the employee was ex-
ercising the right to organize and select an employee
representative.18 Title VII prohibits termination based upon discrim-
ination involving race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.19 In ad-
10. Huff, Thinking Clearly About Privacy, 55 WASH. L. REV. 777, 782 (1980).
11. See H. PERRITT, JR., supra note 4, at 1 n.1.
12. Bok, Discussion of Current Confrontations in Labor Law, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL WINTER MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSO-
CIATION 104 (1966).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958) refers to at-will employment
as follows: "Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to em-
ploy and to serve create obligations to employ and to serve which are terminable upon
notice by either party; if neither party terminates the employment, it may terminate
by lapse of time or by supervening events." I&l
14. United States government employees, along with various state and municipal
employees, may not be terminated without a hearing. See, e.g., Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (1982). The Civil Service Reform Act provides that a gov-
ernment agency may remove or otherwise discipline a covered employee only for such
causes as promote the efficiency of the civil service. It also provides a notice period
prior to adverse action, affords the employee the right to be represented by an attor-
ney, and the right to a written decision enumerating the reasons for the action taken.
'I
15. See, e.g., NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of Am., 128 F.2d 67, 77 (3d Cir. 1942) (hold-
ing that discharge of employee was proper where no statutory prohibition).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1982).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(3).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
dition, several federal statutes contain provisions which directly or'
indirectly restrict employee terminations including the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967,20 the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (OSHA),21 the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjust-
ment Assistance Act,22 the Fair Labor Standards Act,23 the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973,24 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974,25 the Energy Reorganizations Act of 1974,26 the Clean Air
Act,2 7 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,28 the Federal Rail-
road Safety Authorization Act,29 the Consumer Credit Protection
Act,3 0 and the Jury System Improvements Act of 1978.3' Some state
statutes contain similar limitations.3 2
Federal and state legislation has been primarily focused on promot-
ing unionization as a countervailing force against employer power
and control,3 3 and establishing a minimum level of economic entitle-
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982) (prohibiting discrimination based on age).
21. Id §§ 651-678, 660(c)(1) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee for as-
serting rights guaranteed under OSHA).
22. 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026, 2021(a)(A)(i), (a)(B), (b)(1), 2024 (1982) (guaranteeing
the right to re-employment upon satisfactory completion of military service and
prohibiting termination "without cause" within one year after re-employment).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, 215(a)(3) (1982) (prohibiting employee termination for fil-
ing any complaint or instituting any proceeding under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
24. Id, §§ 701-796i, 794 (requiring affirmative action to advance the employment of
handicapped individuals by government contractors or subcontractors).
25. Id. §§ 1001-1461, 1140, 1141 (prohibiting employee termination to prevent them
from attaining vested pension rights).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891, 5851 (1982) (prohibiting employee termination for as-
sisting, participating, or testifying in any proceeding to carry out the purposes of this
Act).
27. Id. §§ 7401-7642, 7622 (prohibiting employee termination for commencing,
causing to commence, or testifying at proceedings against an employer for the Act's
violation).
28. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376, 1367 (1982) (prohibiting employee termination for insti-
tuting or testifying at a proceeding against the employer for the Act's violation).
29. 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-444, 441(a), (b)(1) (1982) (prohibiting railroad companies from
terminating employees who file complaints, institute or cause to be instituted any pro-
ceeding under or related to enforcement of federal railroad safety laws, testified, or
are about to testify, at such a proceeding, or who refuse to work under conditions they
reasonably believe to be dangerous).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-1677, 1674 (1982) (prohibiting employee termination because
of a wage garnishment for indebtedness).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1982) (prohibiting employee termination for service on grand
or petit juries).
32. Several states, including Arizona, California, and Kentucky have statutes
prohibiting terminations based upon political activity. See [1987] Ind'l Empl. Rights
Manual (BNA) 541 (State Laws). A few states, including Idaho, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, North Dakota, and Vermont prohibit termination for serving as jurors or for indi-
cating their availability as jurors. Id Another common provision in state laws is a
prohibition against retaliatory termination for filing a workers' compensation claim,
for example, California, Ohio, and Texas. Id.
33. See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
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ment for employees.3 4 It has also endeavored to combat discrimina-
tion against specific groups in the hiring and terminating process, 35
protect employee health and safety,3 6 and guarantee a minimum
level of security for retirement and for the survivors of wage earn-
ers.37 Additionally, the "assumption of risk doctrine" as applied to
employment has been effectively repealed by workers' compensation
laws.3 8
Until recently, courts consistently upheld the legality of arbitrary
terminations and denied damage claims even where the employee
had been terminated for reasons based upon false information, mis-
take, or malice, or in instances where the employer did not follow its
own published disciplinary and appeal procedures.3 9 However, courts
and legislatures are now creating exceptions to this laissez faire atti-
tude toward employment relationships by permitting employees to
contest certain actions.40 These exceptions may arise out of public
policy considerations41 or rest on the assumption that an implied cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing, whether oral or written, exists in
every employment relationship.42 Despite the influential criticism of
34. See Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1982); Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
35. See 'Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982); Vietnam Era Veterans'
Readjustment Assistance Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 (1982); Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1982) (sections limiting an employer's right to terminate an
at-will employee).
36. See OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
37. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2, 88
Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C. (1982)); Social Se-
curity Act, Pub. L. No. 271, § 1, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C (1982)).
38. See I. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 5.00-20, at 33-39 (1978).
39. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974); see
also Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissa" Time For A Statute,
62 VA. L. REV. 481, 484-91 (1976).
40. For a detailed state-by-state analysis of at-will employment's modification, see
C. BAKALY, JR. & J. GROSSMAN, MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: FORMA-
TION, OPERATION AND REMEDIES FOR BREACH app. A (1983) [hereinafter C. BAKALY,
JR.].
41. The public policy considerations which prohibit terminating an employee in-
clude: (a) declining to commit perjury at the employer's behest; (b) refusing to partici-
pate in an illegal price-fixing scheme; (c) serving on a jury; (d) filing workers'
compensation claims; (e) refusing to take a polygraph examination in a state prohibit-
ing its administration; (f) mislabeling packaged goods; (g) avoiding payment of commis-
sions; and (h) avoiding payment of a pension. See H. PERRrIT, JR., supra note 4, §§ 5.8-
.18.
42. Id. §§ 4.6-.28; see, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal.
several commentators, 43 some jurisdictions continue to adhere to the
at-will employment concept.44
C. Privacy's Historical Development
The concept of privacy within the United States is generally traced
to the Harvard Law Review article written by Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis in 1890.45 Although similar concepts had been ac-
corded recognition by other countries,46 prior to 1890 no cause of ac-
tion for an invasion of privacy could be brought in America.47
Relying on then existing legal doctrines,48 early commentators recog-
nized a privacy right only in narrowly defined situations. Later, com-
mentators based this right's existence on a complete immunity "to be
Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722 (1980).
43. Because of the rapid developments in this area, commentators have considera-
bly influenced the courts to modify or adhere to the at-will employment relationship.
Decisions frequently outline the thoughts of these commentators. See, e.g., Veno v.
Meredith, 357 Pa. Super. 85, 515 A.2d 571 (1986); Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc.,
354 Pa. Super. 199, 511 A.2d 830 (1986); Darlington v. General Elec., 350 Pa. Super. 183,
504 A.2d 306 (1986). For a general discussion of the at-will employment relationship,
see Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Ex-
ercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Decker, New Concerns,
supra note 4; Decker, Reinstatement as a Remedy for a Pennsylvania Employer's
Breach of a Handbook or an Employment Policy, 90 DICK. L. REV. 41 (1985); Decker,
Reinstatement: A Remedy for an Employer's Violation of a Handbook or a Written
Employment Policy, 3 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1985); Decker, At-Will Employment-
supra note 4, Decker, Handbooks and Employment Policies as Express or Implied
Guarantees of Employment-Employer Beware!, 5 U. PITr. J. L. & COM. 207 (1984);
Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania-Proposal for its Abolition and Statu-
tory Regulation, 87 DICK. L. REV. 477 (1983); Decker, Statutory Regulation, supra note
4; St. Antoine, You're Fired!, 10 HuM. RTs. 32 (1982);
For a detailed review of the influence of commentators on this area, see H. PERRITT,
JR., supra note 4, § 1.11. Commentators have had considerable influence upon courts
and legislators in other areas of law. An example relevant to the privacy discussions in
this context is the 1890 law review article by Warren and Brandeis setting the parame-
ters for the invasion of privacy tort. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
44. See C. BAKALY, JR., supra note 40, at app. A.
45. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 43. Warren and Brandeis preferred the phrase
"right to privacy," however, "right of privacy" has become the generally accepted ex-
pression used by legislatures and courts in privacy matters. See W. ZELERMYER, INVA-
SION OF PRIVACY 28 (1959).
46. See S. HOFSTADTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN NEw
YORK 1-2 (1954) (Hebrew law); Gutteridge, The Comparative Law of the Right to Pri-
vacy, 47 LAw Q. REV. 203, 204 (1931) (German and Swiss law); Pound, Interests of Per-
sonality, 28 HARv. L. REV. 343, 357 (1915) (Greek and Roman law); Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 43, at 214 n.1 (French law).
47. See Savell, Right of Privacy-Appropriation of a Person's Name, Portrait or
Picture for Advertising or Trade Purposes Without Prior Written Consent: History
and Scope in New York, 48 ALB. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1983).
48. See, e.g., The Legal Relations of Photographs, 17 U. PA L. REV. 1 (1869) (a per-
son possesses a "natural copyright" in his physical features, and one who appropriates
the person's image in a photograph is subject to an action for damages).
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let alone" or a "reverence for personality. '49
As a result of harrassment by the press, 50 Warren sought to de-
velop a right to privacy. Together with Brandeis, he argued that even
though no prior case law explicitly supported a privacy right's exist-
ence, a reasoned development of common law principles and society's
changing circumstances supported it.51 Their basic assumption was
that the law recognizes novel causes of action.5 2 They noted the need
for this innovation due to the newly developed methods of invading
private and domestic life through photography and newspapers.5 3
Warren and Brandeis recognized that the privacy right should not
be unlimited. Accordingly, they proposed rules specifying that its
scope would not prohibit publication of matters of public or general
interest, or communications privileged under libel and slander law.54
In addition, there was to be no redress for oral invasions in the ab-
sence of special damages and the right would terminate upon the sub-
ject's own publication or consent.55 The proposed rules also provided
that truth and the absence of "malice" would not constitute de-
fenses.56 Finally, remedies were suggested for violations of the
right.57 The article stimulated much complimentary58 and critical59
49. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1888) (the right to
one's "person" may be said to be a right of complete immunity: "to be let alone"); The
Confidence of the Dead, 3 ANDOVER REV. 275, 276-77 (1885) (ethics limit the un-
restricted use of private correspondence and diaries in biographies of deceased persons
based on a "reverence for personality" and a "right of confidence," both of which also
apply to the claims of the living).
50. Warren had married into a socially prominent Boston family. He suffered con-
siderable annoyance from the city's newly-developed "Yellow Press," which pried into
his and his wife's "blue blood" social life in detail. See A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE
MAN'S LIFE 70 (1946). Warren discussed this matter with Brandeis, his law partner
and Harvard Law School classmate. See M. ERNST & A. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY: THE
RIGHT To BE LET ALONE 46 (1962).
51. See Savell, supra note 47, at 4-5.
52. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 43, at 193.
53. 1d at 195.
54. Id at 214-18.
55. Id,
56. Id
57. A tort action for damages would exist in all cases with substantial compensa-
tion for injury to feelings even absent special damages. Injunctions would rarely be
issued. Criminal liability could only be imposed through statutory enactment. Id at
219.
58. See, e.g., Hand, Schuyler Against Curtis and the Right to Privacy, 45 U. PA. L.
REV. 745, 758 (1897) (privacy protection is "natural and sensible" and of "practical de-
sirability"). This argument for a privacy right's recognition is similar to the argument
over a "wrongful termination" cause of action. See, e.g., H. PERRITT, JR., supra note 4,
§ 1.11.
59. See, e.g., Hadley, The Right to Privacy, 3 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1894) (the right
comment in ascertaining this right's existence and subsequent
development.60
D. Employment Privacy
Employment privacy is a growing concern. In fact, next to at-will
employment, privacy is the most rapidly evolving area of employ-
ment law. Commentators are becoming increasingly aware of this
and are lending their influence to its development. 6 '
Privacy concerns the nature and extent of an employee's "right to
be let alone" 62 or to be free from unwarranted intrusions. Yet, since
George Orwell raised the specter of "Big Brother" with his book
1984, computer technology, court decisions, government intrusion,
and employers' rights to know more about the individuals they em-
ploy have all eroded the employees' sense that their lives are a pri-
vate matter.6 3 In fact, virtually from the moment an individual first
walks through an employer's entrance, privacy rights are relin-
quished.6 4 As a condition of employment, employees must disclose
personal facts about their background and continually submit to em-
ployer scrutiny that may or may not be performance related. The
employee may be subjected to a physical examination, polygraph,
psychological evaluation, or even an antibody test for Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).65 Physical intrusion may also
occur through locker searches or frisking as employees leave the
workplace, even though no reasonable suspicion of theft exists. Pri-
of privacy does not exist and arguments in its favor are based on a misunderstanding
of the authorities cited).
60. Savell, supra note 47, at 5-6.
61. Commentators are recognizing the growing importance of employment privacy
interests in the workplace. See, e.g., Belair, Employee Rights to Privacy, 33 N.Y.U.
CONF. LAB. 3 (1980); Castagnera-Cain, Defamation and Invasion of Privacy Actions in
Typical Employee Relations Situations, 13 LINCOLN L. REV. 1 (1982); Craver, The In-
quisitorial Process in Private Employment, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1977); Diamond,
Genetic Testing in Employment Situations: A Question of Worker Rights, 4 J. LEGAL
MED. 231 (1983); Duff & Johnson, A Renewed Employee Right to Privacy, 34 LAB. L.J.
747 (1983); Fox & Ostling, Employee and Government Access to Personnel Files: Rights
and Requirements, 5 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 67 (1980); Hauslet, Employee Privacy, Ikfor-
mation Needs, and the Law, 14 INDUS. & LAB. REL. F. 23 (1980); Hermann, III, Privacy,
The Prospective Employee and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph
and Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L. REV. 73 (1971); Murg & Maledon, Privacy Legis-
lation-Implications for Employers, 3 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 168 (1977); Westin, Privacy
and Personnel Records: A Look at Employee Attitudes, 4 Civ. LIBERTIES REV. 28 (Jan.-
Feb. 1978).
62. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
63. See Cook, Invasion of Privacy: A 1984 Syndrome, 28 INDUS. MGMT. 18 (Sept.-
Oct. 1986).
64. For a concise discussion of employment privacy, see Kaplan & Paller, Jr., The
Protection of Employee Privacy, in THE EMPLOYEE TERMINATION HANDBOOK 115 (J.
Allen ed. 1986).
65. Id.
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vacy interests are also implicated where an employer conducts rou-
tine surveillance and monitoring. Some employers, for example,
have been known to operate video cameras in employee restrooms.
Others have installed computers to monitor performance of video dis-
play terminal operators.66
Employment privacy concerns further extend to employer efforts
to collect personal information that is not job-related. Certainly, the
employer has a legitimate reason to inquire about an employee's abil-
ities, honesty, and prior employment history. But some employers
want to know much more. They assert that everything about an em-
ployee is relevant and necessary in determining suitability for em-
ployment.67 Thus, the employer feels it is important to know if the
employee smokes marijuana at home, is a homosexual, or socializes
with the "wrong" kind of people.
Other privacy concerns are raised when a former employer dis-
closes information to a prospective employer in connection with the
hiring of a potential employee. For example, the former employer
may disclose an employee's confidential medical records to someone
who has no legitimate need to view them, or embarrassing personal
facts about an employee out of spite or revenge. This may subject the
employee to ridicule from friends and acquaintances and even injure
his reputation and limit future employment prospects. 68
Hardly surprising, legislatures and courts are increasingly con-
cerned about employment privacy. While employers may have legiti-
mate business interests that sometimes require infringing on
employee privacy, there are compelling reasons to limit this intrusion
where no legitimate interest exists.
E. Defining Employment Privacy
Employment privacy encompasses a broad spectrum of interests
which relate to the intrusiveness and fairness of collecting informa-
tion, maintaining, using, and disclosing information, and which ex-
tend to the regulation of employee lifestyle both in and outside the
workplace. These interests arise prior to, during, and after the termi-
nation of the employment relationship.
Privacy interests exist in the employee's person, property, or pri-
vate conversations, and private life or beliefs. They are also present
66. Id
67. Id, at 116.
68. Id.
whenever irrelevant, inaccurate, or incomplete facts are used to
make employment decisions, or when employment information is dis-
closed to third parties.69 These interests may be summarized into the
five main employment privacy themes: speech, beliefs, information,
association, and lifestyle. The problem of invading these privacy in-
terests impacts every aspect of employment from hiring, to life inside
and outside the workplace.
Individuals generally feel more comfortable relating personal de-
tails of their lives to a friend since the friend can be trusted to con-
tinue respecting them, despite what they learn. An important
difference between employees' relationships with family and friends
and their relationship with employers, is that employers treat them
as continuing performance evaluation objects.70
Within the employment relationship there are two basic privacies.
One concerns "information privacy," or the interest in controlling the
collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of employment informa-
tion.71 The second concerns "behavior privacy," or the interest in
participating in activities free from employer regulation or surveil-
lance both inside and outside the workplace.72
"Privacy" and "confidentiality" are similar, yet distinct, concepts.
Employment "information privacy" concerns what employee infor-
mation should be collected, how much should be maintained, and
what should be disclosed. "Confidentiality" is concerned with re-
stricting the unauthorized use or disclosure of employment informa-
tion through procedures that ensure such security.73 Confidentiality
requires security controls in oral and written communications as well
as in manual and computerized records.
Unwarranted appropriation of one's personality, publication of
one's private affairs, or the wrongful intrusion into one's personal ac-
tivities so as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humilia-
tion to a person of ordinary sensibilities creates an employment
privacy breach.74 If an employee suffers an adverse effect from a
69. See U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN IN-
FORMATION SOCIETY app. 3 (1977) [hereinafter PRIVACY PROTECTION]; see also Beaney,
The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 254 (1966).
70. H. PERRIT, JR., supra note 4, § 8.15.
71. Belair, supra note 61, at 3-4.
72. Id.
73. The Privacy Act of 1974 requires that federal agencies "establish appropriate
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to insure the security and confidenti-
ality of records and to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to their secur-
ity or integrity .... 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10) (1982). Agencies also must promulgate
"rules of conduct for persons involved in the design, development, operation, or main-
tenance of any system of records ...... Id. § 552a(e)(9).
74. W. PETROCELLI, Low PROFILE-How To AVOID THE PRIVACY INVADERS 112
(1981).
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breach of privacy or confidentiality, a remedy should be provided.75
F. Exercising Employment Privacy Interests
Once the employees enter the employment relationship they must
often relinquish considerable autonomy. Most employees do not bar-
gain for their employment position, and must adhere to the employ-
ers' unilateral terms. If they do not follow these terms, they may not
be hired.
Once employed, the employees must conform to the employers' ex-
pectations, rules, and procedures that define specific rights and re-
sponsibilities. Many are wholly dependent upon the employers for
their economic well-being. Based on the anticipated continuance of
this relationship, the employee makes various financial commit-
ments, such as marriage, having children, or purchasing a home or
automobile. These commitments further establish a financial reli-
ance on the employment relationship.
Absent statutory restrictions, an employer may collect, maintain,
use, and disclose employment information, as well as influence an
employee's lifestyle. 76 In an at-will employment relationship, an em-
ployer can generally terminate employment of an individual who ob-
jects to any of these practices.77 The employee has no acceptable
option; he can either cede to the situation, protest and confront possi-
ble termination, or voluntarily terminate employment.
Concerns about employment privacy exist at the hiring stage and
within and outside the workplace. At the hiring stage, an employee's
privacy may be intruded upon by the employer's use of advertise-
ments, applications, interviews, credit checks, arrest records, finger-
prints, photographs, immigration requirements, reference checks,
medical screening, blood analysis, skill testing, polygraph examina-
tions, honesty testing, or handwriting analysis.
Within the workplace, privacy concerniare raised when dealing
with employment or medical records, smoking, employee assistance
programs, alcohol and drug testing, AIDS testing, sterilization, moni-
75. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D)-(g)(4) (1982) (damage ac-
tion under the Act for failure to comply with any provision that results in an "adverse
effect on an individual").
76. See, e.g., Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328, 1330, 1333-
34 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (termination of at-will employee discovered to be living together in
"open adultery" held not to violate constitutional privacy right); Wendler v. DePaul,
346 Pa. Super. 475, 499 A.2d 1101 (1985) (negative employee evaluation is an opinion
and not libel).
77. Hollenbaugh, 436 F. Supp. at 1333-34.
toring union meetings, camera or electronic surveillance, literature
solicitation and distribution, jury or witness duty, whistle blowing,
dress codes, nepotism, name changes, identification tags, religious ac-
commodation, or language requirements.
Outside the workplace, privacy may be impacted through the dis-
closure of employee associations with bankruptcy and unions, loyalty,
conflicts of interest, off-duty misconduct involving noncriminal or
criminal activities, regulation of lifestyle, or mandatory residency re-
quirements. It is in these areas that employment privacy becomes in-
creasingly significant: these areas are most susceptible to employer
breaches, and are most likely to result in litigation.
III. PRIVACY'S SIGNIFICANCE
In most instances, employment comprises a close relationship be-
tween an employee and employer that each anticipates will continue
for an indefinite time period. As a result of this close and often pro-
longed association, however, many situations arise where privacy be-
comes a significant issue. Privacy concerns can arise whether an
employment relationship exists or not because they may be present
at hiring, during employment, or even after employment terminates.
The problems usually involve employment information that has been
collected to make the hiring decision, used internally to make deci-
sions after hiring, and disclosed to third parties.
At the outset of the employment relationship, information pertain-
ing to employment, educational, financial, medical, and criminal his-
tories is usually collected as part of the application procedure.78
Then, during employment, other information may be gathered, in-
cluding performance evaluations, promotion reports, discipline no-
tices, payroll data, government reports, fringe benefit records,
pension information, and health insurance data. Such information
may be maintained in a manual or computerized record-keeping
system.79
It is the nature of the employment relationship to rely on written
information in decision-miaking.O The employee obliges by providing
information specifically to create and maintain the employment rela-
tionship. Yet the employee has little, if any, control over how this
information is maintained, used, or disclosed.81 Indeed, years later,
other persons, including prospective employers, credit agencies, or
78. PRIVACY PROTECTION, supra note 69, at 72-78 (discussing the information on a
credit application); see also Comment, supra note 8, at 157.
79. Id. at 225-26; see also A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY
9-10 (1972); Comment, supra note 8, at 157.
80. PRIVACY PROTECTION, supra note 69, at 13-14.
81. Id
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governmental agencies, may be granted access to this information
without the employee's knowledge or consent. It is here that safe-
guarding employment privacy takes on particular significance.
Employment information is often maintained long after the origi-
nal collection purpose expires. A written record, unlike the human
memory, remains intact. Hence, the potential for misuse is con-
stantly present.82 Normally, it is the employer who decides what in-
formation must be disclosed and when it must be provided. Rarely
can an employee verify the accuracy or content of the information, or
participate in deciding when, where, and to whom it is disclosed.
The employee can only surmise what employment information ex-
ists. There may be official as well as unofficial employment records.
Identifying errors and finding their source may be difficult. Addi-
tionally, the employee does not know whether past or present em-
ployers may have disclosed information without the employee's
knowledge or prior consent. Through the collection, maintenance,
use, and disclosure of employment information, the employee loses
control over personal information in the employer's possession.83
Overshadowing these concerns, however, is the manner in which an
employer may attempt to regulate the employee's lifestyle, both in
and outside the workplace.
A. Significance for Employers
Record-keeping, disclosure, and privacy statutes, along with accom-
panying case law, have made employment privacy a significant em-
ployer concern. Employers find themselves with conflicting privacy
requirements which restrict their operations.8 4 For example, while
record-keeping requirements mandate information collection, privacy
statutes actually restrict that process. Similarly, while privacy re-
quirements seek to protect employment information, disclosure stat-
utes require access.8 5
Increased governmental regulation of the employment relationship
has expanded employer record-keeping obligations. Certain federal
statutes, particularly OSHA86 and Title VII,87 impose explicit and im-
82. Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 288 (1977).
83. See Miller, The Privacy Revolution: A Report from the Barricades, 19 WASH-
BURN L.J. 1 (1979).
84. See Reinert, Jr., Federal Protection of Employment Record Privacy, 18 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 207 (1981).
85. Id. at 214-26.
86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
plicit record-keeping requirements on employers.8 8 OSHA requires
employers to conduct employee medical surveillance and maintain
records concerning employee occupational health.8 9 Title VII re-
quires an annual statement of the racial, ethnic, and gender composi-
tion of the employer's workforce. 90 These regulations necessitate
extensive and detailed record-keeping.
In addition to these statutory requirements, 91 employers must col-
lect and maintain employment information to effectively operate
their businesses. This information is important in making decisions
about hiring, promotion, training, security, compensation and bene-
fits, retirement, disciplinary actions, termination, and other job op-
portunities. It is here that employee privacy rights must be delicately
balanced with the employer's need to make legitimate, informed
business decisions.
As additional privacy statutes are enacted, employers must become
more cautious in their collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of
employment information. Unaccustomed to outside scrutiny, employ-
ers are surprised to discover that certain employment information
must be disclosed. Unions also request and obtain employment infor-
mation.92 Employers must be aware of federal and state statutory in-
formation disclosure requirements in order not only to avoid and
limit their potential liability, but also to protect employment privacy,
operate their businesses effectively, and maintain good relations with
other organizations.
B. Legislative Action
No comprehensive nationwide statutory protection of employment
privacy currently exists. However, certain federal and state statutes
impose privacy restrictions. Actions by state legislatures have been
more innovative and far-reaching than their federal counterparts.
Constitutional protections for personal privacy have traditionally
been safeguards against governmental rather than private intrusions.
That distinction, however, has disappeared in states whose constitu-
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1982).
88. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982); Equal Pay Act of 1963,
29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982); OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982); Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1451 (1982); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1982); 41 C.F.R. § 60 (1986).
89. 29 C.F.R. § 1904 (1986); see also M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH LAW 180-89 (1978).
90. Form EEO-1, 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (1987).
91. See sources cited supra note 88.
92. See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979) (union requested and
obtained employee aptitude test scores); see also Salt River Valley Water User's Ass'n
v. NLRB, 769 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1985) (union access to confidential personnel informa-
tion upheld).
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tions protect against both. States have recognized the need to bal-
ance an employee's privacy interest against other societal values.
While the United States Supreme Court was reviewing the consti-
tutional privacy right,93 the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)94
was signed at the federal level. The FOIA's purpose was to allow the
public to "have all the information that the security of the Nation
permits."9 5 It also exempted certain confidential information from
public disclosure, such as "personnel and medical files and similar
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy."96
In 1974, the United States Congress debated on legislation that
would increase the protection of governmental information which is
maintained on individuals. A Senate bill provided for a Federal Pri-
vacy Board to oversee the collection, maintenance, and disclosure of
information. 97 The House bill focused on federal agency standards
for data collection and maintenance. 98 These two bills were com-
bined, without a formal conference committee meeting and report,
into the Privacy Act of 1974.99
Under the Privacy Act, an individuall0o has input regarding what
government information is maintained and how and by whom it is
used.101 The individual may request the correction, amendment or
deletion of information, and may take legal action if the request is
denied.102 The "records" protected under this Act include anything
containing the "name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other
identifying particular assigned to the individual."103 Subject to
93. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (fourth amendment includes a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of
privacy found in the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights).
94. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
95. Statement by President Lyndon B. Johnson upon signing Public Law 89-487 on
July 4, 1966. 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 199 (1967).
96. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A)(6) (1982).
97. S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
98. H.R. 16373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
99. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
100. The Privacy Act defines an "individual" as "a citizen of the United States or
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." Id. § 5520a(a)(2). This has been
interpreted to exclude foreign nationals, nonresident aliens, and corporations. See
Raven v. Panama Canal Co., 583 F.2d 169, 171 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980
(1979); Dresser Indus. v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1237-38 (5th Cir. 1979); OKC
Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 541 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
101. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (1982).
102. Id. § 552a(d)(2), (3)-(4).
103. Id. § 552a(a)(4).
twelve exceptions, records may not be released unless pursuant to
the individual's written request or prior consent.104
Other federal statutes also affect employment privacy interests. 0 5
Additionally, "mini-privacy acts" were enacted by various states in
the 1970's to address the need for increased employment privacy. In
acknowledging the right to "be let alone,"'106 these statutes regulate
the collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of information about
individuals by state and local agencies1o7 Like the Federal Privacy
Act of 1974, these state statutes give individuals the opportunity to
discover what information the government collects, maintains, and
discloses about them. Further, they permit individuals to correct or
amend inaccurate government records, and regulate the collection,
maintenance, use, and disclosure of information by government.108
Responses by state legislators have been concerned with privacy is-
sues ranging from the disclosure of credit information,109 to protec-
104. Id, § 552a(b)(1)-(12); see Zeller v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 487, 500-01
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); Local 2407, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Defense Gen. Supply
Center, 423 F. Supp. 481, 483 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd, 573 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1978).
105. These include: certain sections of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501(4), 2302(b)(8)
7324, 7325 (1982) (discussing the political association rights of federal employees and
providing for whistleblowing protection); Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986) (prohibiting a governmental unit from denying employment to a person
who was a debtor within the bankruptcy provisions); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (discussing the collection of non-job-re-
lated credit information); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (discussing employer monitoring or eavesdropping
upon employees); NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (discussing union
associational interests); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982 & Supp. III 1985) (discussing the collection of non-job-related information); Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982) (discussing the collecting of non-
job-related information regarding disabilities); OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985) (discussing the associational interests in maintaining a safe workplace);
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1982) (discussing speech interests by an employee disclosing illegal
activities); certain sections of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986
(1982) (affecting the associational rights of minorities); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to
-17 (1982) (discussing the collection of non-job-related information).
106. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 43, at 205.
107. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-801 to -810 (1979); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798-
1798.78 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-190 to -197 (West Supp.
1988); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1-6-1 to -9 (Bums 1986 & Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 66A (West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.01 to .90 (West Supp. 1987);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-2-59 to -89 (1986 & Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-377 to -
386 (1987); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204 (1982 & Supp. 1986) (restrictions on
access to state agency records); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
108. 1&
109. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1691 to -1696 (West 1987); CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 1785-1786.56 (West 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-431 to -435 (West
Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 559.55 to .78 (West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 50-701 to -722 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 367.390 to .990 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1311-1329 (1964 & Supp. 1987); MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. §§ 14-201 to -204 (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, §§ 50-68 (West 1984
& Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 31-3-101 to -123 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 359-B:1 to :21 (1984 & Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3-1 to -8 (1986); N.Y. GEN.
[Vol. 15: 551, 1988] Employment Privacy Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tion for whistleblowing,lO to employee access to personnel files. 111
Other statutes are concerned with prohibiting an employer from in-
quiring into an employee or a prospective employee's past arrests and
convictions,112 psychological matters, 13 communicable diseases," 4
smoking,15 and the employee's voting preferences."l6 Furthermore,
some states have enacted little "Hatch Acts"17 and other statutes
Bus. LAW §§ 380-380-s (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 81-
85 (West 1987); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 9016 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
110. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-535 (1985); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West
Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115 (1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 127, para.
63B119c.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-15-10-1 to -6 (Burns 1986 &
Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 19A.19 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 75-2973 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.101, .102, .103, .990 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1074.1 (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§§ 831-840 (1986 & Supp. 1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A, § 12G (1986); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17.428.1 to .9 (Callaghan Supp. 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 98-E (Supp.
1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to -8 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 240.316(5), 240.740 (1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§§ 1421-1427 "(Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 36-15-1 to -9 (1986 & Supp. 1987);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-21-1 to
-9 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.40.010, .020, .030, .050, .070 (1981); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 230.80, .81, .83, .85, .88 (West Supp. 1987).
111. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5 (West Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31-128a to -128h (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 631, tit. 30, §§ 664,
2257 (Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 423.501-.512 (Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 652.750 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1321-1324 (Purdon Supp. 1987); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 3-6A-31 (Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-18-1, -18-5 (1986); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 317(b)(1) (1985 & Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 103.13(7)-(8)
(West Supp. 1987).
112. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-
3-34 (1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 831-3.1(a)-(c) (1985 & Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 9125, tit. 43, §§ 1321-1324 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.31
(West 1984 & Supp. 1987).
113. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95A (1985).
114. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.606 (West 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.15
(West 1985 & Supp. 1987) (AIDS).
115. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.35.300, .310, .330, .340, .342, .343 (1986); FLA. STAT.
§ 386.201-.109 (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1580-A(1)-(7) (Supp.
1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.413-.417 (West Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-40-
103 to -107 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-5703 to -5713 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 155:51-:53 (1986 & Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:3D-24 to -30 (West 1987); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 23-20.7-2 to -7 (1986 & Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-101 to -110
(1986 & Supp. 1987); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 101.123 (West Supp. 1987).
116. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.25.090, 15.56.100 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-1306
(1976); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14350 (West 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-7-102 (1980); GA.
CODE ANN. § 21-2-404 (1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-95 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 6.76
(West 1986); WYo. STAT. § 22-2-111 (1977).
117. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 39.25.160 (1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 83-119 (1976);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-266a (West Supp. 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1, to -91
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 67-5311 (1980 & Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24 1/2, para. 38t
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 19A.18 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987); KAN.
regulating the practice of fingerprintingila and polygraph testing.119
C. Judicial Responses
Judicial protection of employment privacy is generally premised on
constitutional, tort, or contract theories. The federal government and
some states recognize a limited constitutional right to personal pri-
vacy or a right to be free from intrusion into one's private affairs.12o
Unlike the federal constitution, the states' constitutions recognize a
specific privacy right.121
Tort causes of action such as invasion of privacy, defamation, false
imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
maintenance or disclosure of employment records, fraudulent mis-
representation, and intentional interference with contractual rela-
tions may provide employment privacy protection.
Invasion of privacy is recognized in four forms: intrusion upon
one's physical solitude or seclusion,122 public disclosure of private
facts about an individual,123 publicity placing an individual in a false
light before the public,124 and appropriation of one's name or
likeness.125
STAT. ANN. § 75-2953 (1984 & Stupp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A.140, -.145
(MichieBobbs-Merrill 1985 & Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7056 (Supp.
1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 36.150 (Vernon Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 98:18-:19
(1977); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 106 (Consol. 1982 & Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 126-
13 to -15 (1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 260.432 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.904 (Pur-
don Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 364-51 to -53 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-19
(1986); W. VA. CODE § 29-6-20 (1986).
118. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1051 (West 1971); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-a (McKin-
ney 1986).
119. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (1984); CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West Supp.
1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51g (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (1985); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 36-801 to -803 (1981); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-903 to -904 (1977); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7166 (Supp. 1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1985 & Supp.
1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.201-.208 (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.75-
.76 (West Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-303 to -304 (1987); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 659.225-.227 (1983); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7321 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 28-6.1-1 to -2 (1986 & Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 2901 (Supp. 1987); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.44.120-.130 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE § 21-5-50 (1985); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 111.37 (West. Supp. 1987).
The following state statutes require licensing of polygraph examiners: ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 32-2702(A) (1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7154 (Supp. 1986); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 338.1708 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 648.060 (Michie 1986); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 61-26-4 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-27-106 (1986).
120. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 12; LA.
CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art.
I, § 7.
121. Id
122. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 807-09 (4th ed. 1971).
123. Id. at 809-12.
124. Id. at 812-14.
125. Id at 804-07.
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Only public disclosure of private facts has been generally used in
the employment privacy context.126 One of the elements of this tort
is a "public disclosure." This has been defined as the communication
to a large number of persons of true, but embarrassing, private
facts.' 27 Information contained in personnel files involving perform-
ance evaluations, test scores, salary histories, and medical informa-
tion constitutes such "private facts" which, if disclosed by an
employer, may give rise to an action in tort.128 Usually, an em-
ployer's communication of private facts about an employee is made to
a sufficiently limited number of persons that the disclosure cannot be
said to be "public."129 However, there are indications that as employ-
ment privacy becomes more significant this tort will take on greater
importance as the courts balance their willingness to expand an es-
tablished cause of action with their reluctance to create a new
right.130
Defamation consists of the publication of an untrue statement that
subjects a person to ridicule, hatred, or contempt.13 ' In the employ-
ment relationship, defamation may arise when an employer com-
municates false and/or malicious information about an employee. In
addition, the communication of negative performance evaluations or
reasons for termination may give rise to a claim for defamation.13 2
Employers are protected by a qualified privilege 3 3 which absolves
them of liability when the communication is made in good faith, in
response to a legitimate inquiry, and within the employment rela-
tionship's information channels.
126. See, e.g., Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir. 1974) (release of in-
accurate personnel file); Bulkin v. Western Kraft East, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 437 (E.D. Pa.
1976). (negligent maintenance of employment records).
127. W. PROSSER, supra note 122, at 809-10.
128. See sources cited supra note 126.
129. See Kobeck v. Nabisco, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 652, 305 S.E.2d 183 (1983) (employer's
disclosure of employee's attendance record to her spouse held insufficient to establish
a tort cause of action because of lack of physical intrusion).
130. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of Am., 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986) (em-
ployee's privacy rights invaded by a polygraph test). Creation of new employee privacy
rights surround the debate over the abrogation of the at-will employment relation-
ship. See generally H. PERRITT, JR., supra note 4.
131. W. PROSSER, supra note 122, at 739.
132. But cf Biggins v. Hanson, 252 Cal. App. 2d 16, 59 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1967) (inter-
office memo discharging employee which referred to his disloyalty, insubordination,
and threat to sabotage equipment was conditionally privileged, but privilege could be
lost if abused); Wendler v. DePaul, 346 Pa. Super. 479, 499 A.2d 1101 (1985) (negative
employee performance evaluation disseminated only to employee's relation manager is
not defamatory as a matter of law).
133. W. PROSSER, supra note 122, at 785-96.
False imprisonment protects the individual's interest in freedom
from restraint of movement.13 4 It may occur in the employment con-
text when an employer or its agent restrains an employee in some
way, usually to search or interrogate the employee regarding theft at
the workplace..3 5
Intentional infliction of emotional distress may arise in the em-
ployment context if there is an intrusion into an employee's privacy
that is extremely outrageous.' 3 6 Hence, this tort is only useful for re-
dressing the most extreme employment privacy invasions. 3 7 Such a
claim may arise, for example, where an employee is terminated for
continuing a social relationship with another employee outside the
workplace where no adverse job performance results or where there
is no negative effect on the employer's business.SS
The negligent maintenance of employment records may also be im-
portant in the employment privacy context. The employer has a duty
to act carefully in maintaining employment records and providing
employment references, and some employees have been able to re-
cover damages against employers who negligently disclosed inaccu-
rate employment information to third parties. 139
The tort of fraudulent misrepresentation may arise when an em-
ployer induces an employee to act or to refrain from acting. Here, an
employer could, for example, misrepresent its reasons for collecting,
maintaining, using, or disclosing employment information.140
Intentional interference with contractual relations may arise when
the employer interferes with an employee's prospective contractual
relationship. Privacy interests are affected by employer interference
in matters where it has no right or interests. This has occurred, for
example, when a medical staff requested a hospital board to termi-
nate a doctor's privileges.141
Furthermore, public policy violations may also protect privacy in-
terests in employment. Causes of action have been permitted for vio-
134. Hd at 42.
135. See, e.g., Faniel v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 404 A.2d 147 (D.C. 1979).
136. W. PROSSER, supra note 122, at 55.
137. See Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 75 Or. App. 638, 707 P.2d 1256 (1985), rev'd in
part, 719 P.2d 854 (1986).
138. But qf i&i (employer's conduct in firing male employee for maintaining a rela-
tionship with female employee, while rude, was not "outrageous in the extreme" so as
to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
139. See sources cited supra note 126.
140. See Mueller v. Union Pac. R.R., 220 Neb. 742, 371 N.W.2d 732 (1985) (employee,
fired after aiding railroad investigation in uncovering fraud by his supervisor, had
cause of action when he relied on vice president's promise that employees would not
lose their jobs if they cooperated with the investigation).
141. See Gordon v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 340 Pa. Super. 253, 260, 489
A.2d 1364, 1370 (1985).
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lating a clear statutorily declared policy,142 for reporting information
of unlawful or improper conduct of fellow employees,143 and for re-
fusing to accede to improper employer demands.144
Finally, contract law may provide another arena in which to raise
employment privacy concerns. These concerns may arise out of oral
and written employment contracts, restrictive covenants, employ-
ment handbooks and policies, or collective bargaining agreements.
IV. AREAS OF CONCERN
A. Employment Information Collection
We live, inescapably, in an "information society." 145 Increasingly,
government agencies, record-keeping organizations, and employers
must join together to collect employment information. 1 4 6 As stated,
concerns can arise in the initial collection over the accuracy of the in-
formation, in restricting the use of the collected information, and to
what extent and to whom it should be disclosed.
When applying for a job, an individual must provide fairly basic
personal information through the application form to assist the em-
ployer in making the hiring decision. This information may be sup-
plemented and verified by testing, interviews, medical screening,
references, and credit reviews along with a background investigation.
If the individual is subsequently hired, this information is expanded
to accommodate records for wages, benefits, performance evaluations,
promotions, and attendance. In addition, the employer may use more
sophisticated methods to collect information about the employee, in-
142. See Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (refus-
ing to take a polygraph examination in state prohibiting its employment use).
143. See Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (em-
ployee fired for helping police investigate another employee's criminal conduct).
144. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (female em-
ployee fired for refusing to date her supervisor).
145. PRIVACY PROTECTION, supra note 69, at 5. For an in-depth discussion on the
"information society," see Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Chal-
lenge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1089
(1969); Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971
(1975); Comment, The Use and Abuse of Computerized Information: Striking a Bal-
ance Between Personal Privacy Interests and Organizational Information Needs, 44
ALB. L. REV. 589 (1980).
146. PRIVACY PROTECTION, supra note 69, at 13-15. For example, Form EEO-1 is
used by the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) and the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) to obtain affirmative action information about
the hiring of minorities and women. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (1987).
cluding personality tests147 and polygraph examinations.148 Such col-
lection methods should not be allowed to violate an employee's
privacy, especially where the information received is irrelevant, con-
fidential, or likely to be used unfairly in decision-making.
Other employment information collection tests include fingerprint-
ing, blood tests, physical examinations, and work area surveillance.
These methods can be distinguished from polygraph and personality
tests in that they have generally been considered valid collection
methods because their scope of inquiry is not as intrusive.149 Fur-
thermore, these methods are more concerned with collecting evi-
dence than with compulsorily extracting incriminating facts.150 For
example, fingerprinting is "only a means of verifying the required in-
formation... [and] involves no additional intrusion into the personal
lives of employees."151 A routine physical examination or blood test
is likewise not an offensive prying.152 Photographing employees in
work areas can be a reasonable employer method to improve effi-
ciency when recording what is already public.153
Even if the applicant is not hired, information is still created about
applicants, as well as about those who become employees. Because of
147. The personality test is a broad review of an employee's personal life that meas-
ures emotional adjustment, social relations, motivation, and interests. There are two
types of personality tests: the inventory measures test and the projectile test. The in-
ventory test provides an objective measure of the subject's interest in certain types of
activities or of particular personality traits. It is used to predict job performance. The
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is a familiar example of this
test. The projective test is illustrated by the Rorschach ink blot test. Comment, supra
note 8, at 190 & n.235.
148. The polygraph examination is intended to be a truth-verification collection de-
vice. For a discussion of its operation, see id. at 188 n.220. While the intrusive nature
and accuracy of the polygraph have been challenged, it is clear that it affronts the
mental and physical dignity of employees. Id. As a result, it is frequently regulated or
prohibited by statute. See supra note 119.
149. Comment, supra note 8, at 191 n.241 (citing Division 241, Amalgamated Transit
Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976) (rule requir-
ing blood and urine tests for public bus drivers after any serious accident or suspicion
of intoxication is not a violation of the fourth amendment because the state had a rea-
sonable objective in furthering public safety, and the actual conditions and the manner
of the intrusion were not unreasonable); Thom v. New York Stock Exch., 306 F. Supp.
1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Miller v. New York Stock Exch., 427
F.2d 1074 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970) (statute requiring fingerprinting of
stock exchange workers held constitutional as valid exercise of police power in com-
batting theft in the securities industry); Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792
(W.D. Ky. 1962) (taking motion pictures of employees by an employer does not violate
the employee's right to privacy when the purpose was to study manufacturing methods
and processes); Pitcher v. Iberia Parish School Bd., 280 So. 2d 603 (La. Ct. App. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 904 (1974) (requirement that public schoolteachers submit to an-
nual physical examination is reasonable)).
150. Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966)).
151. Id. (citing Thorn, 306 F. Supp. at 1009).
152. Id. at 191-92.
153. Id. at 192 (citing Thomas, 207 F. Supp. at 799).
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the extent of the information, entities unrelated to the employment
relationship, such as governmental agencies, often consider employ-
ment records to be a valuable resource to be tapped. Confidentiality
in information use and disclosure is a legitimate concern of both the
applicant and employee. As a result, the employer's inquiries about
applicants and employees should not become overly intrusive.
It is imperative that information be collected through reliable
methods that seek to discover only employment-related facts. In pro-
viding this information, employees should be able to preserve dignity,
prevent personal embarrassment, and foreclose economic harm.154
They should not be required to submit to collection methods causing
anxiety and humiliation similar to a criminal interrogation. Employ-
ers conducting background investigations should not interview third
parties without the employee's knowledge. Requiring that the em-
ployee at least be informed of the fact of the investigation would not
be a burden on the employer. 5 5 Responsibility in providing employ-
ment information, however, must be balanced with the employer's
need for efficient decision-making. Statutory or court protection
should safeguard employees from collection processes that are overly
inquisitive and that obtain information unrelated to the employer's
need for efficient decision-making.
B. Employment Information Maintenance and Internal Use
After collecting the information, the employer obviously wants to
put it to use. This may involve disclosing information to supervisors
who will use it in decisions concerning selection and placement,
transfer, promotion, demotion, training, discipline, administration of
employee benefits, and separation by involuntary or voluntary termi-
nation. In addition, employment information may need to be dis-
closed to the human resources department, the payroll department,
or supervisory personnel. This information is a vital component in
deciding what person is hired, terminated, placed, transferred, pro-
moted, demoted, trained, or disciplined, along with what compensa-
tion and benefits are to be paid.
However, all decisionmakers do not need to review or have access
to unnecessary information that is simply not essential for the partic-
ular decision they are making. It is unnecessary, for example, for a
supervisor preparing a performance evaluation to review an em-
154. Reinert, Jr., supra note 84, at 210-11.
155. Comment, supra note 8, at 192.
ployee's medical and financial history.156
Employees have a legitimate interest in restricting the use of infor-
mation to the purpose for which the employer originally collected it.
The employee normally has no right to prevent improper disclosures;
in fact, the employee is usually not even aware that this might occur.
Improper internal use can be minimized by requiring disclosures for
"routine uses" only which should be established by the employer.157
Each routine use should be evaluated depending on whether it is con-
sistent with the purpose for which the information was collected and
the decision for which it is applicable.158 For example, a performance
evaluation's routine use would include decisions about promotions,
wages, or discipline; routine uses for medical information would in-
clude decisions about employee medical and life insurance plans.159
Information access should be granted by the employer to desig-
nated personnel strictly on a need-to-know basis.160 Limiting access
in this way would not hinder an employer's operational efficiency. It
minimizes potential employment information misuse and protects the
employee.
C. Employment Information Access
The employee should have access to employment information. The
rationale is simply stated: this personal information was first in the
employee's exclusive possession. It may reveal personal details af-
fecting the employee's potential security, dignity, and reputation.
This information was generally obtained by the employer as a result
of the employee's economic need to obtain employment to support
himself and family.
Computer technology enables the employer to administer large
volumes of employment information. Through this, employers can
transfer and assemble employment information almost anywhere
within microseconds.16 1 Storage capabilities prolong employment in-
formation longevity, making improper disclosure and misuse almost
as permanent as the information itself.162
To safeguard employment privacy, employers should regularly
purge their records of unnecessary and out-dated employment infor-
156. Id, at 195. The Privacy Commission observed that "so long as there are no ab-
solute barriers to an employer's use of its employee medical and insurance claims
records ... a privacy problem of potentially major proportions exists." PRIVACY PRO-
TECTION, supra note 69, at 229.




161. See Miller, supra note 145, at 1093-99.
162. Gerety, supra note 82, at 288.
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mation. Likewise, employees should be granted access to the infor-
mation so that they can correct and supplement it, thereby ensuring
that information kept in their employment files that may be dis-
closed to others is accurate.163 It would be the employee's responsi-
bility to exercise this privilege.
The employee's concern over the accuracy or relevancy of employ-
ment information needs to be balanced against the employer's needs.
The employee cannot be permitted to perpetuate fraud on an em-
ployer by failing to disclose discreditable personal information that
would affect the employee's job performance or harm the employer's
business. To the extent that an employee conceals personal informa-
tion to mislead, the justification for according protection to this infor-
mation is no better than that for permitting fraud in the sale of
goods. 164 The employee should be required to disclose all informa-
tion that is directly related to job performance.
D. Employment Information Disclosure to Third Parties
Internal use of employment information is a necessary function. It
relates to employee wage rates, promotions, reassignments, and work
performance. Disclosures to third parties are ordinarily discretion-
ary. They primarily affect the employee's life outside of the work-
place. Frequently, they involve employment references for a new job
or disclosures to credit agencies. The adverse effect of negative dis-
closures may continue for years.' 65 Mandatory employer disclosures
to third parties include responses to subpoenas and reports required
by government regulations. 166
While employer policy and practice has been to provide some confi-
dentiality to employment information, whatever confidehtiality ex-
ists is generally the result of employer voluntary action. Only
limited statutory controls exist to preserve employment information
confidentiality. 167 Employment information disclosure to third par-
ties involves the unpredictability or uncertainty of the employer's
goodwill and personal value system in handling the sensitive
163. Comment, supra note 8, at 194.
164. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 399-400 (1978).
165. The Privacy Commission summarized privacy law with respect to employment
information disclosure when it stated that "[t]he confidentiality of [employee] records
is maintained today solely at the discretion of the employer and can be transgressed at
any time .... PRIVACY PROTECTION, supra note 69, at 269.
166. See Murg & Maledon, Privacy Legislation-Implications for Employers, 3 EM-
PLOYEE REL. L.J. 168, 169-170 (1977).
167. See supra notes 94-119 and accompanying text.
information.168
The employee's ability to disclose knowledge and personal informa-
tion is the linchpin of privacy. This corresponds with the employee's
opportunities to limit or monitor employer information disclosures
about him. 6 9 Random employment information disclosures, absent
an employee's knowledge or consent, should be curtailed. Employees
should be granted a remedy if certain information is disclosed with-
out their prior consent.170 This could include damages, back pay, and
reinstatement.171
E. Employee Lifestyles Inside and Outside the Workplace
Generally, an employee's private activities inside and outside the
workplace are not open to employer scrutiny or regulation. The ac-
tivities outside the workplace are usually within the employee's ex-
clusive purview. The employment relationship does not make the
employer guardian of the employee's personal actions. Yet, in certain
areas directly affecting the employer's business affairs, the employer
may attempt to regulate the employee's lifestyle.172 This may result
168. Mironi, Confidentiality of Personnel Records: A Legal and Ethical View, 25
LAB. L.J. 270, 275 (1974).
169. One commentator has stated:
In developed societies, the only way a person may be given the complete mea-
sure of both the sense and the fact of control is through a legal title to control
.... Privacy is more than an absence of information abroad about ourselves; it
encompasses a feeling of security in being able to control that information. By
using the impersonal, public and ultimate institution of law to grant persons
this control, at once the right to control is put far beyond question and at the
same time indicates how seriously that right is taken.
Pipe, Privacy: Establishing Restrictions on Government Inquiry, 18 AM. U.L. REV. 516,
519 (1969).
170. Limitations on the employer's right to communicate truthful information
about an employee to third parties might be challenged as a violation of the employer's
right of free speech.
171. For example, § 158(a)(3) of the NLRA provides that an employer may not dis-
criminate "in* regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of em-
ployment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). Under the NLRA's § 160(c), the NLRB may issue a cease
and desist order to the employer and may order reinstatement of employees "with or
without back pay." Id. § 160(c). The NLRB's findings are usually accorded great
weight and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence. See Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951). A finding of reinstatement may be
overturned if an employee commits criminal acts, threatens the safety of persons or
property, or disrupts the operation of a business. See, e.g., NLRB v. Apico Inns of Cal.,
Inc., 512 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1975) (prior to termination, the employee, a bartender,
drank while on duty, made profane remarks and lewd comments to waitresses and cus-
tomers); NLRB v. Big Three Indus. Gas & Equip. Co., 405 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1969)
(employee, a truck driver, was a habitual violator of traffic laws). Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 also contains a provision that outlaws discrimination against em-
ployees who oppose unlawful employment practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982).
172. See Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1159
(1986) (police department's attempt to regulate white police officer's off-duty conduct
performing as a "blackface" was offensive to the black community).
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in employee disciplinary actions, including termination.
Lifestyle regulation at the workplace may concern dress and
grooming standards, spousal employment, consumption of alcohol,
smoking, and drug use. Outside the workplace, limits on an em-
ployee's lifestyle may be placed on the employee's social contacts,
other employment opportunities that may directly conflict with the
employer's business, and the type of image the employee maintains
in the community.
When employee lifestyle regulation inside and outside the work-
place occurs, it should be reasonable and directly related to the em-
ployee's position.173  Regulation should occur only when the
employee's lifestyle will have a definitive adverse effect on the em-
ployer's business affairs. Every limit on an employee's lifestyle inside
and outside the workplace should be evaluated on its own merit.174
Any attempt to regulate the employee's lifestyle should be readily
justified: the reason should be easily discernible to a third party as
being in the employer's business interest.175 It should be harmful in
that the employer will sustain financial loss absent the regulation.
Mere speculation regarding impact on the employer's affairs should
not suffice to permit a constraint to be placed on the employee's
lifestyle.176
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing examination of employment privacy interests in hir-
ing, at the workplace, and outside the workplace has not purported to
offer the only, or necessarily the preferable, method of dealing with
this increasingly important subject for the 1990's. Voluntary em-
ployer compliance is only an intermediate measure. Statutory regu-
lation at the federal and state level will increasingly prove to be the
most substantive means to confront this.
The need for thoughtful study is clear. Until the impact or viabil-
ity of statutorily regulating employment privacy concerns is assessed,
courts may develop case law that overburdens the judicial system by
173. See J. REDEKER, DISCIPLINE: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 214-19 (1983).
174. Id
175. See Rulon-Mller v. IBM Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984)
(privacy invaded where no legitimate conflict of interest existed in dating employer's
competitor for which employee was terminated).
176. See Movielab, Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 632, 633 (1968) (McMahon, Arb.) (em-
ployee disciplinary action, based upon his conviction for conduct outside the employ-
ment relationship, is not a proper basis in all instances).
failing to set forth specific guidelines. This will be costly for employ-
ees, employers, and an already overtaxed judicial system.
The time is ripe for all interested parties to begin a realistic exami-
nation. Employers should no longer ignore the warning signals that
forbode increased employer liability in the 1990's.
